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ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT IN
MISDEMEANOR CASES
ERNEST W. MACHEN, JR.*
The North Carolina legislature may soon be called upon to re-
examine the law defining the power of peace officers to arrest without
a warrant in misdemeanor cases. The need for such re-examination
has long existed, but this fact only recently has been brought dramatically
to the attention of officials and the public as a result of the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court's decision in State v. Mobley.1
The over-all problem of determining what authority agents of the
executive branch of the government should have in making arrests on
their own initiative, without an order from an official of the judicial
branch, is very complex. It involves the consideration of many factors
important in keeping the machinery for the administration of justice in
delicate balance with respect to the rights of individuals and the needs
of the state.2 It is not appropriate that this article should discuss these
factors, though they should be weighed carefully in any plan to rewrite
the basic law of arrest.3 Rather the purpose here will be to discuss only
those problems raised by the Mobley decision, and to suggest additional
areas where uncertainties exist in this important field.
The essential facts of the case can be stated briefly. The chief of
police of the town of Dallas, North Carolina, undertook to arrest the
defendant without a warrant, on the ground that the defendant was
committing the offense of public drunkenness in the police officer's pres-
ence. Defendant denied that he was drunk, resisted the arrest, and
struck the officer a blow on the head before being subdued and carried
to jail. Subsequently he was brought to trial, charged with public
drunkenness, resisting arrest, and assault. The jury returned a verdict
* Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest School of Law.
1240 N. C. 476, 83 S. E. 2d 100 (1954).
- See, POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTIcE IN AmERICA (New York: Holt, 1945).
' Numerous articles have appeared in recent years, containing various sugges-
tions for modernizing the law of arrest. See, e.g., Hall, The Law of Arrest in
Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. OF CHI. L. Rav. 345 (1936);
Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315 (1942) ; Warner, Modern
Trends in the American Law of Arrest, 21 CAN. B. REV. 192 (1943) ; Warner,
Investigating the Law of Arrest, 26 A. B. A. J. 151 (1940), reprinted in 31 J.
CRm. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 111 (1940); Waite, Some Inadequacies in the Law
of Arrest, 29 MIcH. L. Ray. 448 (1931) ; Waite, The Law of Arrest, 23 TEXAS L.
REv. 279 (1946) ; Potts, The Law of Arrest, 1 BAYLOR L. REV. 397 (1949) ; Com-
ment, Some Proposals for Modernizing the Law of Arrest, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 96
(1951). Unfortunately, some of the suggestions are concerned only with expe-
diency in law enforcement, and perhaps give insufficient consideration to the other
factors involved.
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of guilty on the two latter charges, but found the defendant not guilty of
public drunkenness.
It is settled law in this jurisdiction, that a person may use reasonable
force to resist an illegal arrest.4 Consequently, the defendant on appeal
urged: (1) that public drunkenness is not a breach of the peace, so that
the officer had no authority to arrest defendant without a warrant for
this offense, and (2) that if an officer does have authority to arrest for
misdemeanors committed in his presence other than breaches of the
peace, it is within the province of the jury to determine whether the
officer had sufficient reason to believe defendant was publicly drunk
when arrested, and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury, in
effect, that the officer was the sole judge as to the reasonableness of this
belief. 5
The State challenged the first of these contentions, citing in its brief
several cases wherein the North Carolina court had approved arrests
without warrant for public drunkenness.0 As to the second, the argu-
ment was strongly made (and supported by various authority) that
even though the jury subsequently found that the defendant was not in
fact guilty of that offense, nevertheless the arrest would be justified if
the officer had reason to believe, from observing the defendant, that he
was publicly drunk.7
The Supreme Court of North Carolina held: first, that with certain
exceptions not here applicable, an officer has no authority to arrest
without a warrant in misdemeanor cases unless the misdemeanor amounts
to a breach of the peace; second, that public drunkenness alone is not
a breach of the peace; and third, that the officer's good faith in believing
he had the authority to arrest is immaterial. Therefore, since the arrest
was unauthorized, the defendant could not properly be convicted of re-
sisting and assault, there being no showing that he used excessive force.
The "breach of the peace limitation." There is no question but that
at common law a peace officer had no power to arrest without a warrant
for a misdemeanor, except when a breach of the peace had been com-
mitted in his presence, or when he had reasonable grounds to believe
that a breach of the peace was about to be committed or renewed in his
presence.8
' State v. Allen, 166 N. C. 265, 80 S. E. 1075 (1914). This rule has been
criticized on the ground that the legality of the arrest should not be settled by
fighting it out on the street. The rule was established in an era when jails were
so unsanitary that many persons died there while awaiting trial. See Warner,
Investigating the Law of Arrest, 26 A. B. A. J. 151, 152 (1940) ; Comment, 39
CALrF. L. Rxv. 96, 111-112 (1951).
1 Brief for Appellant, pp. 9-12, State v. Mobley, 240 N. C. 476, 83 S. E. 2d 100
(1954), quoting from State v. McNinch, 90 N. C. 695 (1884).
' Brief for the State, pp. 3-6, State v. Mobley, supra note 5.
7Id. at 6-13.
89 HALs ZsR's LAws oF ENGLAND, § 612 (1909); State v. Belk, 76 N. C. 10,
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In recent years, however, there has been a gradual breaking down
of this rule, particularly with respect to the breach of the peace limita-
tion. The change has been worked largely, as might be expected, by
direct legislative action, but the courts too have played their part. Not
many have undertaken by judicial fiat to discard the limitation outright,9
but several have sought to enlarge the officer's power of arrest by classi-
fying as a breach of the peace conduct which actually falls somewhat
short of that concept.10
More than seventy years ago, the North Carolina court employed
a similar approach when, in State v. Freeman," Justice Ashe announced
that "we can see no reason why [a person] may not upon view be ar-
rested for public drunkenness; for when open and exposed to public
view, it becomes a nuisance."'12 In subsequent decisions, the breach of
the peace limitation was gradually lost sight of, at first in reliance on
this novel idea that an officer might arrest for any "nuisance" (which
seemed to embrace most minor offenses, especially those prohibited by
town ordinance) committed in his prdsence,1 3 and later, through inad-
vertence in the frequent reiteration of the rules of arrest in general
terms.' 4
The court in State v. Mobley, however, chose not to continue this
innovation, and specifically overruled that portion of State v. Freeman,
as well as the holdings and dicta in subsequent cases which had failed to
state the rule in its common law form. In doing so, the court pointed
first to the fact that the authority relied on in the Freeman case was
erroneous, and second, to the fact that the power of arrest in North
Carolina has since 1869 been defined and limited by statute.' 5
13-14 (1877); Commonwealth v. Gorman, 288 Mass. 294, 192 N. E. 618 (1934).
Authorities are collected in Bohlen & Shulman, Arrest With and Without a War-
rant, 75 U. or PA. L. REv. 485, 486 n. 2 and 3 (1927).
1 The A. L. I. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDUEm 232-233 (1931) listed several cases,
but Bohlen & Shulman, supra note 8, at 486 n. 4-6, had earlier demonstrated that
only one was a direct holding.
" See, e.g., State ex rel. Thompson v. Reichman, 135 Tenn. 653, 188 S. W. 225
(1916) (selling liquor); Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn. 544, 238 S. W. 588 (1922)
(possessing and transporting liquor) ; Miles v. State, 30 Okla. Cr. 302, 236 Pac.
57 (1925) (possessing liquor); Haynes v. State, 71 Fla. 585, 72 So. 180 (1916)
(carrying concealed weapon); State v. Gorham, 288 Mass. 294, 192 N. E. 618
(1934) (driving while intoxicated). Public drunkenness, however, was not so
classified: State v. Mullins, 135 W. Va. 60, -, 62 S. E. 2d 562, 566 (1950), and
cases cited in State v. Mobley, 240 N. C. 476, 482, 83 S. E. 2d 100, 104 (1954).
1186 N. C. 683 (1882).
' Id. at 685.
"See State v. McNinch, 87 N. C. 567 (1882) ; Brewer v. Wynne, 163 N. C.
319, 79 S. E. 629 (1913).
14 See cases cited in Brief for the State, pp. 5-6, State v. Mobley, 240 N. C. 476,
83 S. E. 2d 100 (1954), which were disapproved by the court. Id. at 486, 83 S. E.
2d at 107. See also, State v. Campbell, 182 N. C. 911, 110 S. E. 86 (1921) and
State v. Jenkins, 195 N. C. 747, 143 S. E. 538 (1928).
" And once the law is codified "an arrest without warrant except as authorized
by statute is illegal." State v. Mobley, 240 N. C. 476, 480, 83 S. E. 2d 100, 103
ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
With respect to arrests without warrant in cases of felony, North
Carolina General Statute 15-40 (hereafter referred to as G.S.) states
the power of private persons, and G.S. 15-41 the power of peace officers.
But G.S. 15-39, said the court, "confers on peace officers and private
persons, on equal terms, the power of arrest without warrant in certain
misdemeanor cases," all of which involve breaches of the peace. It
might be noted in passing that G.S. 15-39 does not by its terms apply
to peace officers. There is room for argument that it was designed to
apply only to private persons, and that the officer's power to arrest in
misdemeanor cases was tobe left where it was at common law. 10 How-
ever, the result is nearly the same, since G.S. 15-39 comes rather close
to stating the common law rule.17
That this portion of the Mobley decision corrects an error in the
North Carolina cases and clarifies the law on this point can hardly be
denied. Whether the law as we have it is what it should be is indeed
another matter, as the court itself hastened to emphasize. It would be
appropriate for the legislature,' wrote Justice Johnson, to determine
whether the law has kept pace with the exigencies of the times in con-
ferring adequate powers of arrest on peace officers.' 8
Most states have long since entirely abolished the breach of the peace
limitation by direct legislative action. The typical statute provides: "A
peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a public offense
committed or attempted in his presence."'19 Other statutes authorize
such arrests for any "offense,"' 20 any "indictable offense,"'2 1 any "crimi-
(1954). This may be, where the statute purports to cover the entire field; see,
e.g., LA. REv. STAT. § 15:59 (1950). However, if this is true in North Carolina,
we are in need of more legislation. E.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-43, 45 (1953)
mention arrest to prevent a felony, but no such power is directly given an officer
by statute, though this power existed at common law.
"-8 Note that sections applicable to private persons begin, as does G. S. 15-39,
with the words "Every person" (G. S. 15-40, 15-45), whereas sections applicable to
officers indicate the officers to whom they apply (G. S. 15-41, 15-44).
"Close, but not quite. G. S. 15-39 provides: "Every person present at any
riot, rout, affray or other breach of the peace, shall endeavor to suppress and pre-
vent the same, and, if necessary for that purpose, shall arrest the offenders." If
read literally, an officer (if it applies to him) could not arrest for a breach of the
peace already completed or discontinued prior to arrest, since an arrest would not
be necessary to suppress and prevent the same. At common law, an officer was not
so limited; see note 8 supra.
8 The Judicial Council has under consideration proposals to liberalize the present
statutes, and will make its recommendations to the 1955 General Assembly.
" CAL. PEN. CODE § 836 (1949) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. c. 6, § 19-603 (1948) ; IOWA
CODE c. 755, § 755.4 (1954); MINN. STAT. § 629.34 (1949); MONT. REv. CODE:
ANN. § 94-6003 (1947) ; NEV. CoMP. LAWS § 10751 (1929) ; N. D. REV. CODE § 29-
0615 (1943); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §196 (1951); S. D. CODE §34.1609 (1939);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-3 (1953). Similar statutes are found in ALA. CODE tit.
15, § 154 (1940), and TENN. CODE, ANN. § 11536 (Williams 1934) ("for a public
offense committed or a breach of the peace threatened in his presence."). ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 43-403 (1947) is the same except that it omits reference either to
offenses attempted or breaches of the peace threatened.
"0 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 465 (1949) as amended by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 150c
[Vol, 33
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nal offense,"' 22 any "crime," 23 any "misdemeanor, ' 24 or for the violation
of "any law"2 5 or "any criminal law' 26 committed in the officer's pres-
ence. The variations in these terms might at first appear to be purely
formal, and indeed, in some instances there is little to indicate that any
thought was given to the significance of the particular phrase chosen.
When we consider, however, the difficulties often encountered by the
courts in determining such questions as whether the violation of every
law is a "crime," whether the word "misdemeanor" embraces every
offense below felony, whether the violation of a town ordinance or a
rule of an administrative board constitutes a "crime," then the impor-
tance of selecting a phrase which exactly describes the type of miscon-
duct to be included in the officer's power of arrest without warrant be-
comes quite apparent.
27
But whatever the specific scope of the statutes, it is clear that the
vast majority of the states have already taken action to broaden the
officer's power of arrest without warrant to include virtually all misde-
meanors committed in his presence, so that no more than half a dozen
states now have as their basic law, applicable to peace officers generally,
the common law rule.
28
It has been a common practice in virtually all of the states to enact
statutes authorizing particular classes of officers, or peace officers gen-
(Supp. 1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-207 (1953); KAN. GEN. STAT. §§ 13-623, 625
(1949) (police of first class cities) ; see also, §§ 14-819, 820 (police of second class
cities), § 15-601 (marshals of third class cities), and § 80-704 (constables) ; N. MEx.
STAT. ANN. § 14-1606 (1941) (municipal peace officers). United States marshals
and their deputies are given this power by 18 U. S. C. § 3053 (1952). In 1951 like
powers were extended to agents of the F. B. I., 18 U. S. C. § 3052 (1952). See
also D. C. CODE ANN. § 4-140 (1951).
2i Miss. CODE ANN. § 2470 (1942). For some purposes, the phrase "indictable
offence!' has been deemed not to include misdemeanors. Apparently the Mississippi
court has not so treated it in this connection. See Paramount-Richards Theatres,
Inc. v. City of Hattiesburg, 210 Miss. 271, 282, 49 So. 2d 574, 579 (1950).
22 ILL. REV. STAT., c. 38, §§ 655, 657 (1953).22N. Y. CRim. C. § 177.
"' Aniz. CODE ANN. § 44-124 (1939) ; DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1906 (1953);
FLA. STAT. § 901.15 (1953); LA. REv. STAT. § 15:60 (1950); MicH. ComP. LAws
§ 764.15 (1948) ; N. H. REv. LAws c. 423, § 25 (1942) ; R. I. Pt. LAws 1941, c.
982, § 68, cl. 5; VA. CODE ANN. § 19-73 (Cum. Supp. 1954) ; Wis. STAT. § 354.03
(1949).
" IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-1024 (Bums 1942) ; ME. REv. STAT., c. 134, § 4 (1944);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 85.230 (1949) (municipal peace officers) ; NEB. REv. STAT. §29-401
(1948); OHio GEN. CODE ANN. § 13432-1 (1939); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §252
(Supp. 1953) (state police); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-301, 10-2502, and
13-406 (constables) (1945). See also, N. Y. ExEc. LAW § 223 (state police outside
of municipalities).
2 ILL. REv. STAT. c. 24, § 9-93 (1953) (municipal officers); KAN. GEN. STAT.
§ 80-704 (1949) (constables) ; S. C. CODE ANN. § 17-253 (1952) (sheriff and depu-
ties) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6291a (1949) (sheriff and deputies).
" A sound caution against provisions embracing every petty offense was voiced
by Bohlen & Schulman, supra note 8, at 490-492.
"8 No general statutes to the contrary were found for Colorado, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Texas.
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erally, to arrest on sight without warrant persons offending against a
particular law. For example, this has been done in North Carolina with
respect to violations of the 1937 Motor Vehicle Law, the illegal trans-
portation of liquor, and a variety of other offenses. Conspicuous omis-
sions from this list include such crimes at petit larceny,29 carrying a
concealed weapon, malicious injury to property, certain offenses against
morality (including prostitution), delaying or obstructing an officer in
the performance of his duty, violation of lottery and gambling laws,
public drunkenness, and vagrancy. The act of committing any one of
these offenses may be effected in such a way as also to breach the peace,
but in the absence of that possibility, as the law now stands, an officer is
without power in North Carolina to arrest for any of these offenses
committed in his presence.
Yet, prior to the-Mobley decision, not only were arrests for these
offenses being made daily without warrant by officers who believed
themselves to be properly executing their solemn duty, but had an officer
had the temerity to decline to do so, he would undoubtedly have in-
curred the wrath of his superior, and members of the by-stauding public
as well.
When the law thus lags far behind accepted practice, there is a
strong incentive to ignore the law because it is "technical." But dis-
regard of the law by officers charged with its enforcement is a dangerous
habit to allow to develop in a democratic society, as "it breeds contempt
for law; it invites every man to be a law unto himself." 30  If the law
relating to police authority is unreasonably restrictive, it should be
changed, and when changed, scrupulously observed.
The officer arrests without warrant at his peril. Having found that
the officer had no authority to arrest for the offense of public drunken-
ness even though committed in his presence, the court in the Mobley
case would ordinarily have had no occasion to go further. However, as
pointed out above, the State had proceeded with its argument in the
belief that the officer did have such power, and accordingly anticipated
this further question: Was the officer required to determine at his peril
whether the accused actually was drunk in public, or would the arrest
be justified if, after observing the defendant's conduct, the officer had
reasonable grounds so to believe? Apparently in response to the State's
argument on this issue, the court *remarked that "a person making an
"Larceny was originally included along with felony in G. S. 15-40, and G. S.
15-41, but was dropped by the editors of the Revisals of 1905, apparently because
N. C. PuB. LAws 1895, c. 285 (now G. S. 14-72) made some larcenies a misde-
meanor. Failure to drop the word larceny from G. S. 15-45 was evidently inad-
vertent. Recently, Massachusetts included all larceny in its statute on arrest with-
out warrant, MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 276 § 28 (Supp. 1953).
"Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277
U. S. 438, 485 (1928).
[Vol. 33
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arrest under the authority of G.S. 15-39 must determine, at his peril,
preliminary to proceeding without a warrant, whether an offense arrest-
able under the statute is being committed." 3'
Law enforcement agencies throughout the state immediately indicated
grave concern over the possible implications of this statement. They
feared it might have the effect of rendering every arrest without warrant
in misdemeanor cases illegal in the event the accused is subsequently
acquitted of the charge for which the arrest was made.3 2 The paralyzing
effect which this rule would have, on all. patrolling activity is obvious.
Law enforcement would soon be reduced to a process of gathering evi-
dence and serving warrants.
Whether or not the court intended to go this far, it certainly gave,
that impression by the language used, and by its action in disapproving
certain pronouncements in earlier cases.33 Yet, all that the court was
called upon to hold in this regard was that there are certain misde-
meanors over which an officer has no power of arrest without a warrant,
even when the offense is actually committed in his presence, and if he
assumes to arrest for one of these, good faith will not justify his action.
What, then, is the extent of this rule that an officer arrests without
a warrant in misdemeanor cases at his peril? To begin with, there are
four elements that might be required in all such arrests: first, the exist-
ence of a valid criminal law prohibiting specific conduct; second, conduct
on the part of the arrestee which (apparently) violates that law; third,
the presence of the officer at the time and his awareness, through his
own senses, that the arrestee is engaged in such conduct; and fourth,
in states such as North Carolina, authority in the officer to arrest on
view, without a warrant, for that particular type of offense. Will the
officer be permitted any reasonable margin of error as to the existence of
any of these elements, or must he, at his peril, determine that all are
present?
That he will be permitted no error as to the first element seems
settled in this jurisdiction by State v. Hunter,34 the case principally
relied on for the statement in the Mobley <ecision quoted above. There
the officer in good faith arrested a citizen on the street, without a war-
rant, for conduct prohibited by a local ordinance. The officer was later
convicted of false imprisonment, and the court affirmed on the ground
that the ordinance which the citizen had violated was unconstitutional
State v. Mobley, 240 N. C. 476, 483, 83 S. E. 2d 100, 105 (1954).
See Opinion of Attorney General of North Carolina to Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles, August 13, 1954.
" State v. Mobley, supra note 31, at 486-7, 83 S. E. 2d at 107-8. Indeed, in
disapproving the passage from State v. McNinch, 90 N. C. 695 (1884), the court
went further than defendant, who, in his brief, relied upon that very passage as
authority for his contention set forth supra text at note 5.
,106 N. C. 796, 11 S. E. 366 (1890).
1954]
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and void. Thus, the officer must determine at his peril, when proceed-
ing without a warrant (or for that matter, with a warrant, according to
some cases), 5 that the statute or ordinance which the arrestee is violating
is a valid one.
Next, skipping for the moment to the third element, there are liter-
ally scores of cases holding that an arrest without a warrant is illegal,
even though the arrestee is in fact committing a misdemeanor at the
time, if the officer acts on suspicion and does not in fact see, or otherwise
perceive with his own senses, acts which themselves indicate a violation.3
Many cases reciting the "arrest at his peril" doctrine are actually con-
cerned only with this point, which really does nothing more than enforce
the requirement that the officer must view the offense itself as distin-
guished from conduct which only arouses his suspicion that an offense
may be in progress.
8 7
State v. Mobley stands at least for the proposition that an officer will
be permitted no error as to the fourth element. Thus, when an officer's
power to arrest without warrant in cases less than felony is limited
(as it is in this state by G.S. 15-39 and other statutes) to some but not
all misdemeanors, the officer must determine at his peril before proceed-
ing without a warrant, that the misdemeanor for which the arrest is to be
made is one falling within, and not without, that limitation.
As to the second element, however, the majority of courts38 have
not held the officer to a standard of infallibility as to whether the accused
is in fact guilty of the offense which the officer observed. Since guilt
or innocence is a matter for the court and jury to determine through the
trial process, the most that need be required of the arresting officer is
that he observe conduct which, to all intents and purposes, constitutes
an offense.
It might be said that permitting an arrest on "reasonable belief" is
appropriate only in felony cases, where the offense does not usually
occur in the officer's presence, and that in misdemeanor cases, where it
must occur in his presence, the officer either sees an offense or he does
See Crawford v. Huber, 215 Mich. 564, 184 N. W. 594 (1921) ; but the usual
holding is otherwise, Rush v. Buckley, 100 Me. 322, 61 Atl. 774 (1905)."6 See, e.g., cases collected in Coates, The Law of Arrest in North. Carolina,
15 N. C. L. REv. 101, 109-110 (1937) ; Perkins, The Tennessee Law of Arrest, 2
VAND. L. REv. 509, 564-566 (1949) ; Note, 44 A. L. R. 132 (1926).
' See State v. McAfee, 107 N. C. 812, 12 S. E. 435 (1890) ; Adair v. Williams,
24 Ariz. 422, 210 Pac. 853 (1922); Fitzpatrick v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 385,
275 S. W. 819 (1925).
', Coverstone v. Davis, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P. 2d 876 (1952), Note, 25 So. CAL.
L. RU. 449 (1952) ; Goodwin v. State, 148 Tenn. 682, 257 S. W. 79 (1924) ; State
v. Mullins, 135 W. Va. 60, - , 62 S. E. 2d 562, 568 (1950); Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co. v. Waller, 208 Ark. 1063, 189 S. W. 2d 361 (1945) ; Doak v. Spring-
stead, 284 Mich. 459, 279 N. W. 898 (1938) ; and cases collected in Brief for the
State, p. 13, State v. Mobley, 240 N. C. 476, 83 S. E. 2d 100 (1954); Perkins,
supra note 32, at 566; Stone, Arrest Without Warrant [1939] Wis. L. REv. 385,
387-388.
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not, and there is no room for speculation as to whether he thought he
saw one.3 0 This argument loses most of its force when we consider
(1) the fact that not all defendants who actually do violate the law in
an officer's presence are ultimately convicted, and (2) that it is not
always easy to determine as a matter of law what constitutes an offense,
for example, an assault.
40
Because of the possible uncertainty raised by the Mobley decision on
this point, the North Carolina legislature might well consider the advisa-
bility of inserting the "reasonable grounds to believe" phrase in statutes,
which confer upon officers the power of arrest without warrant in mis-
demeanor cases. This has already been done in a number of juris-
dictions, 41 and it probably would not encroach unduly upon individual
liberty, provided, of course, the reasonableness of the officer's action is
kept subject to close judicial scrutiny.
"Historically, the "reasonable belief" phrase was omitted when stating the
rule for arrest in misdemeanor cases only because it was not thought necessary; see
Warren, Modern Trends in the Anzericam Law of Arrest, 21 CAN. B. REv. 192,
200-201 (1943).
40 See, e.g., State v. Mclver, 231 N. C. 197, 56 S. E. 2d 604 (1949) and State
v. Ingram, 237 N. C. 197, 74 S. E. 2d 532 (1953).
"IDiiL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1906 (1953); IowA CODE, c. 755, 755.4 (1954)
N. H. REv. LAWS, c. 423, § 25 (1942) ; R. I. PuR. LAWS 1941, c. 982, § 68, cl. 5;
VA. CODE ANN. § 19-78.1 (1950) ; Wis. STAT. § 354.03 (1949) ; D. C. CODE ANN.
§ 23-306 (1951). See also, ILL. REy. STAT., c. 38, § 657 (1953) (certainty as to
offense; probable cause as to offender); MicH. Coms. LAws § 764.15 (1948) (as
to escaped convicts, parol violators, etc.) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 2474 (1942) (spe-
cifically saves arrester from civil or criminal liability notwithstanding innocence
of arrestee) ; Tax. CODE CRIm. PROC. § 214 (Vernon 1948).
